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Introduction
During the COVID-19 pandemic and the “infodemic” (World 
Health Organization, 2020) surrounding it, numerous con-
spiracy theories about the origin and scale of the virus have 
been spreading on social and news media. They claim, for 
instance, that the virus is a bioweapon developed by the 
Chinese government (Sardarizadeh & Robinson, 2020), or 
that Bill Gates is using the pandemic to force mass vaccina-
tion on the population (Huddleston, 2020).
Although conspiracy theories currently abound, and 
scholars, news media, and the public are devoting a great 
deal of attention to them, conspiracy theorizing is not a new 
phenomenon. In fact, conspiracy theories have existed 
throughout history (Knight, 2003)—often amplified during 
crises (van Prooijen, 2018)—and they are more diverse than 
might appear in the spotlight of the current pandemic.
Based on the widespread existence of conspiracy theories 
and the increased attention they have been receiving on social 
media, scholarly efforts to understand the phenomenon have 
gained momentum (for overviews, see Butter & Knight, 2017; 
Douglas et al., 2019). Numerous attempts have been made to 
conceptualize conspiracy theories (for overviews, see 
Thresher-Andrews, 2013; Walker, 2018), resulting in multiple, 
partly conflicting definitions. Drawing on the conceptual ele-
ments of definitions that seem most established in the field, we 
define conspiracy theories as proposed explanations for events 
or practices that refute established accounts and instead refer 
to secret machinations of influential people or institutions act-
ing for their own benefit (e.g., Coady, 2003; Goertzel, 1994; 
Hofstadter, 1965; Keeley, 1999; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).
For a long time, conspiracy theories were considered to be a 
deviant social phenomenon (Hofstadter, 1965) and an individ-
ual and societal anomaly (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). In 
recent years, however, they have penetrated mainstream dis-
course and legacy media coverage (Waisbord, 2018), permeated 
popular culture (Uscinski, 2018) and political rhetoric (Mede & 
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Schäfer, 2020), and have become increasingly “normalized, 
institutionalized and commercialized” (Aupers, 2012, p. 24). 
This increasing normalization of conspiracy theories is one of 
the factors driving a growing interest among researchers in how 
conspiracy theories are mediated and communicated (Stempel 
et al., 2007). Unsurprisingly, the role of new information and 
communication technologies is at the center of this emerging 
research field (Wood, 2013) as it explores how social media 
interplay with conspiracy theories (e.g., Bessi et al., 2015; Smith 
& Graham, 2019). In addition, recent research has focused on 
“deplatforming,” that is, permanently banning, extremist con-
tent on social media (e.g., Rogers, 2020).
Using a communication science perspective, our study 
contributes to this body of research by tackling a specific 
shortcoming of prior scholarship: While most existing stud-
ies have analyzed individual conspiracy theories or focused 
on conspiracy theories as a generic phenomenon, our research 
systematically maps communication about the most visible 
conspiracy theories to highlight the topical diversity of con-
spiracy theory discourses—before the coronavirus domi-
nated different platforms and conspiracy talks.
The contribution of our article is threefold: By analyzing 
various conspiracy theories, we take a significant step toward 
understanding the diversity of conspiracy theories on social 
media; their communities, that is, users propagating the same 
conspiracy theories; and main propagators within these 
communities. These three foci provide an empirically 
grounded understanding of the dissemination of conspiracy 
theories on Twitter as one of the most widely used social 
media platforms (N. Newman et al., 2020) that contains a 
considerable amount of misinformation (Brennen et al., 
2020). Combining large-scale social network and in-depth 
qualitative content analysis, we studied 106,807 tweets 
related to 10 conspiracy theories published over a 6-week 
timespan between 11 December 2018 and 23 January 2019.
Conceptual Framework
Conspiracy Theories and Social Media
When analyzing conspiracy theories, social psychologists and 
political scientists often seek to explain why individuals believe 
in conspiracy theories, while most communication researchers 
are concerned with how specific conspiracy theories are repre-
sented in legacy, online, and social media, that is, how promi-
nent conspiracy theories are there, among whom, and what 
effects this may have. The respective scholarship has mostly 
analyzed conspiracy theories related to the Anti-Vaccination 
movement (e.g., Smith & Graham, 2019), 9/11 (e.g., Stempel 
et al., 2007), climate change (e.g., Gavin & Marshall, 2011) as 
well as, more recently, COVID-19 (e.g., Bruns et al., 2020).
On social media platforms like Facebook or Twitter, users 
can upload content, distribute their own and others’ content, 
endorse content by liking or commenting upon it, and therefore 
rapidly disseminate conspiracy theories and amplify their 
visibility. As shown in prior studies, conspiracy theories, along 
with other forms of misinformation, often spread to audiences 
faster than verified information. Vosoughi et al.’s (2018) study 
of misinformation on Twitter demonstrates that “falsity travels 
with greater velocity than the truth,” as they find that misinfor-
mation propagates faster, deeper, and wider online (p. 1149). 
Similarly, Friggeri and colleagues (2014) show that on 
Facebook, rumor cascades resulting from individuals’ reshar-
ing run deeper in the network than other forms of information.
Social media’s ability to disseminate content is critical to 
conspiracy theories. A hallmark of conspiracy theories is their 
heavy reliance on (alternative) evidence and the highly repeti-
tive nature of their claims. Miller (2002) points out that social 
media have brought these characteristics “to a qualitatively 
different level” (p. 45). Online platforms, for instance, give 
conspiracy theorists the opportunity to cross-reference and 
mutually support their claims. Following the 2012 Sandy 
Hook shooting, conspiracy theorists in the United States pub-
lished video “evidence,” claiming that the incident was staged 
by a group of “crisis actors”: individuals trained and recruited 
to portray disaster victims. Supporters of this conspiracy the-
ory uploaded additional YouTube videos purportedly showing 
that the same “crisis actors” also appeared in other incidents 
such as the Boston Marathon bombing (Wood, 2013).
Alongside cross-referencing, the visibility of conspiracy 
theory content online also encourages more individuals to pub-
licly share their beliefs. This “snowball effect” of conspiracy 
theory exposure is related to Kuran’s (1997) theory of prefer-
ence falsification, according to which individuals who hold 
unpopular minority opinions hold back their genuine positions 
under perceived social pressure and only reveal their ideas 
when they encounter a critical mass of like-minded people. As 
DeWitt et al. (2018, p. 326) point out, Kuran’s theory of prefer-
ence falsification explains why individuals are more likely to 
publicly endorse unpopular ideas like conspiracy theories when 
they perceive safety in numbers. Arguably, more than any other 
medium, social media serve as platforms where people can find 
such a sense of safety in numbers, because the visibility of con-
spiracy content online affords believers the opportunity to find 
and connect with like-minded people.
In this vein, focusing on communities propagating conspir-
acy theories on social media is crucial in three respects. First, 
like-minded individuals tend to interact with each other 
(Williams et al., 2015) to reinforce existing ideological identi-
ties or to strengthen group affiliations (Yardi & Boyd, 2010). 
In addition, research suggests the existence of highly polarized 
and homogeneous communities around conspiracy and scien-
tific topics on Facebook and YouTube (Bessi et al., 2016; 
Cinelli et al., 2021). Second, conspiracy theories tend to 
remain confined to their communities (Sunstein & Vermeule, 
2009) and not to spread haphazardly from person to person 
through social media (DeWitt et al., 2018). Third, research has 
shown that conspiracy beliefs tend to “stick together” (Douglas 
et al., 2019, p. 7); thus, people who believe in one conspiracy 
theory are likely to also turn to others (van Prooijen, 2018). 
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Effectively counteracting the spread and impact of conspiracy 
theories requires an in-depth understanding of the propagators 
and communities who disseminate them.
Most earlier studies took one of two approaches to study 
conspiracy theories online. They either analyzed conspiracy 
theories as a general, abstract phenomenon (e.g., Bessi et al., 
2015) or focused on specific conspiracy theories around vac-
cination (e.g., Broniatowski et al., 2018), 9/11 (e.g., Stempel 
et al., 2007), or climate change (e.g., Lewandowsky et al., 
2013). While both approaches have merits, they fail to con-
sider important parallels and distinctions between conspiracy 
theories—either because they analyze the phenomenon on a 
meta-level or because they only focus on one topic, which 
makes it difficult to draw comparisons across conspiracy the-
ories. This is particularly problematic as accumulated evi-
dence across different studies suggests that the emergence 
and dissemination of misinformation online varies consider-
ably from topic to topic (Zhang et al., 2015; Zubiaga et al., 
2016). Thus, we aim to deliver a more comprehensive picture 
by mapping the structure and networked properties of the 
most visible conspiracy theories on Twitter. Therefore, we ask 
the following research questions (RQs):
RQ1: Which conspiracy theories are prevalent on Twitter?
RQ2: Which conspiracy theories are propagated by the 
same Twitter users, that is, are there communities propa-
gating the same conspiracy theories?
In addition, our analysis centers on the micro level of indi-
viduals. To date, little is known about the composition of 
communities around conspiracy theories, including the main 
propagators, who play an important role in the distribution 
network of conspiracy theory content. Addressing this gap, 
we ask:
RQ3: Who are the main propagators disseminating con-
spiracy theories on Twitter?
Disseminating Content on Twitter: Types of 
Interaction and Influence
We chose Twitter for analysis. As an important component of 
today’s information ecosystem, it contains a considerable 
amount of misinformation (Brennen et al., 2020) and is com-
paratively easy to access for scientific research. In addition, 
due to its interactive and networked nature that facilitates the 
formation of communities, Twitter is a powerful platform to 
study the dissemination of misinformation and plays a sig-
nificant role in propagating conspiracy theories (e.g., 
Broniatowski et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 2018).
On Twitter, people are directly connected through an under-
lying network (Boyd et al., 2010). Due to its technological 
affordances, it enables different types of interaction. According 
to Bruns and Moe (2014), these interaction types operate on 
micro-, meso-, and macro-layers of communication and infor-
mation exchange, which in turn are interconnected in various 
ways. While hashtags, as indicators of topics, discourses, or 
events, are situated on the macro level, following other users 
as the most prevalent from of interaction is located on the 
meso level of exchange. Replying to other users’ tweets or 
mentioning them are types of interaction which are closely 
related to individuals and micro-level communication. 
Retweeting, that is, forwarding other users’ tweets, serves as a 
transversal interaction as messages are transferred from the 
macro level to the micro level and thus to the attention of a 
user’s own followers. Therefore, retweeting is a powerful way 
of disseminating content on Twitter more widely since the 
original message is transmitted to new individuals and com-
munities (Boyd et al., 2010; Suh et al., 2010). Apart from that, 
retweeting can be understood as a way of validating content, 
participating in conversations, and engaging with others. 
Moreover, spreading others’ tweets suggests that the original 
message contains valuable information (Boyd et al., 2010).
Based on these forms of interaction, Cherepnalkoski and 
Mozetič (2016) differentiate three types of influence. While the 
number of followers indicates the in-degree influence of a user, 
his or her number of mentions and replies points to the mention 
influence and thus to the users’ ability to participate and engage 
with other people. The number of retweets individuals get, their 
retweet influence, signals that these users produce content that 
might be of interest for others and worth sharing.
Since we aim to provide a comparative picture of conspir-
acy theories on Twitter, we focus on hashtag-based networks 
on the macro level of communication, identifying the most 
visible conspiracy theories and mapping their diversity. In 
addition, we seek to shed new light on communities around 
conspiracy theories as well as on the main propagators who 
spread them. In this vein, we build on retweet networks, since 
research has shown that these serve as an appropriate analyti-
cal tool to reveal “influential” users and processes of informa-
tion diffusion occurring on Twitter (Boyd et al., 2010; 
Cherepnalkoski & Mozetič, 2016; Suh et al., 2010).
Data and Method
We rely on two datasets: A first dataset (D1) containing 
111,466 tweets published between 2011 and 2018 was used 
to answer RQ1. The second dataset (D2), which builds on D1 
and comprises 106,807 tweets generated over a 6-week 
timespan between 11 December 2018 and 23 January 2019, 
served to answer RQ2 and RQ3.
Detecting Conspiracy Theories via Hashtag Co-
Occurrence Network Analysis (RQ1)
We started with a purposive sample of English-language 
Twitter accounts that spread a range of conspiracy theories and 
provide insights into different conspiratorial movements. 
These accounts were collected through snowball sampling. 
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We first targeted well-known conspiracy theory accounts on 
Twitter, like @AboveTopSecret and @davidicke. From these 
accounts, we expanded our list by including conspiracy theory 
accounts that were retweeted or “similar accounts” recom-
mended by Twitter. Three criteria were used to select profiles 
in this step. First, we chose “general” conspiracy theory 
accounts that do not predominantly focus on one single con-
spiracy theory by verifying that the first five posts on the time-
line covered at least two conspiracy theories. Second, we 
ensured that these profiles propagate different types of con-
spiracy theories, for instance, scientific (e.g., vaccination) and 
political (e.g., 9/11) ones. We compared our resulting list of 
conspiracy theories with scholarly typologies of conspiracy 
theories (e.g., Huneman & Vorms, 2018; Räikkä, 2009) and 
empirical studies on specific conspiracy theories to ensure our 
list was not biased by the selected accounts. Third, we limited 
our study to Twitter accounts with English-language content. 
Following this procedure, we identified 40 Twitter accounts. 
Using Twitter’s API (application programming interface), we 
collected up to 3,200 tweets from each account’s timeline. In 
total, 111,466 tweets published between 2011 and 2018 were 
included in Dataset D1.
To identify conspiracy theories on Twitter, we applied 
network analysis of co-occurring hashtags. Hashtag-based 
gathering approaches come with some limitations; for 
instance, users may modify hashtags to add new arguments 
on a topic, or leave hashtags out entirely when replying to a 
tweet (Burgess & Bruns, 2015). However, this approach 
seemed acceptable for this study, which aimed to identify 
specific rather than more amorphous and compound conspir-
acy theories. Similar to Burgess and Matamoros-Fernández 
(2016), we extracted all 5,242 unique hashtags appearing in 
D1 to identify “issue clusters” (see Supplementary Material, 
Figure A1, for co-occurrence network of hashtags). In the 
network, each node represents a hashtag, and an edge is 
drawn between two hashtags when they appear in the same 
tweet. We used the Louvain modularity algorithm to detect 
clusters of conspiracy theories (Blondel et al., 2008), using 
modularity classes as the nodes partition parameter. From 
each modularity class that contains more than 5% of nodes, 
we used degree centrality as a measure to assess each 
hashtag’s visibility, and selected only those with a degree 
above 50. In the following step, hashtags were qualitatively 
assigned to 10 topic groups based on their thematic relation-
ship. Through this process, we identified the 10 most visible 
conspiracy theories and the 43 hashtags most often associ-
ated with them (see Table 1).
It is notable that QAnon-related hashtags appeared in this 
network as well, but we decided not to include them for data 
collection, guided by two rationales. First, QAnon can be 
described as a “tent” conspiracy theory (Zuckerman, 2019, p. 
3) or meta-conspiratorial narrative that interweaves a wide 
range of conspiracy theories. Second, QAnon-related 
hashtags are frequently used in ambiguous contexts. As prior 
literature indicates (e.g., Conover et al., 2011; Graham, 
2016), hashtags affiliated with conservative politics (e.g., 
#TheGreatAwakening, #WWG1WGA, #tcot, #tgdn) are 
commonly used by their supporters for self-identification, 
regardless of the actual topic of the tweet. Our pilot data col-
lection, which included QAnon-associated hashtags, sup-
ported this observation. As it turned out, less than 5% of 
these tweets referred to any specific conspiracy theory.
Analyzing Conspiracy Theory Communities via 
Retweet Network Analysis (RQ2)
To better understand which conspiracy theories are propa-
gated by the same users, we conducted retweet network anal-
ysis to identify communities related to the 10 conspiracy 
theories listed above. For this purpose, we used the hashtag 
list mentioned in the previous section to retrieve tweets on a 
daily basis, employing Twitter’s search API. In total, we col-
lected 106,807 tweets generated by 35,333 unique accounts 
between 11 December 2018 and 23 January 2019 in the sec-
ond dataset (D2). This 6-week timespan was selected delib-
erately to ensure that samples for each conspiracy theory 
were large enough to identify communities while avoiding 
major events or anniversaries (like the anniversary of 9/11) 
Table 1. Conspiracy Theories and Related Hashtags.
Conspiracy theories Hashtags
Agenda 21 #depopulation #depopulationagenda #agenda21
Anti-Vaccination #antivaxxers #vaccineskill #vaccinelies #vaccineInjured #vaccinescauseautism #vaccinedamage #antivax
Chemtrails #Chemtrails #opChemtrails #Chemtrail #opstopchemtrails
Climate Change Denial #ClimateChangeHoax #GlobalWarmingHoax #GlobalWarmingFraud
Directed Energy Weapons #directedenergyweapons #directedenergyweapon #dew
Flat Earth #domexit #earthaintnoglobe #earthisflat #fakemoonlanding #fepe #flatearth #globehoax #globeisalie 
#globexit #nasalies #marshoax #moonhoax #moonlandinghoax #researchflatearth #fakespace
Illuminati #killuminati #illuminati
Pizzagate #PedoGateIsReal #PizzaGateIsReal
Reptilians #dracoreptilians #reptilians
9/11 #911truth #911wasaninsidejob
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which might have skewed our data toward one specific con-
spiracy theory (for a daily distribution of all tweets, see 
Supplementary Material, Figure A2).
To identify communities, we analyzed group partitions in 
the retweet network with the Louvain modularity algorithm 
(Blondel et al., 2008). Modularity is a scalar value that quan-
tifies the quality of partitions by comparing the density of 
links from inside the module (e.g., community, cluster) with 
that in a random network structure (M. E. J. Newman et al., 
2002). Blondel et al.’s (2008) algorithm serves to identify 
high modularity partitions, wherein nodes belonging to one 
module are densely interconnected but sparsely connected 
with nodes in different modules. A filter was used to keep 
major modularity classes that contain more than 5% of nodes.
Examining the Main Conspiracy Theory 
Propagators via In-Depth Qualitative Analysis 
(RQ3)
Based on Dataset D2, we identified the main accounts con-
tributing to the propagation of the 10 selected conspiracy 
theories by utilizing network metrics. As we are most inter-
ested in the dissemination of conspiracy theories, “influ-
ence” is understood as one account’s ability to widely spread 
information within the network they belong to, which in turn 
affects the actions of many other users in the network (Li 
et al., 2014; Riquelme & González-Cantergiani, 2016). In 
order to identify the main propagators of each community, 
we used the well-known PageRank algorithm (which was 
originally developed by Brin & Page, 1998, to measure the 
relevance and presence of web content through hyperlinks in 
Google’s search engine but has since been applied widely in 
social network analysis) as a measure of influence 
(Heidemann et al., 2010; Riquelme & González-Cantergiani, 
2016). Unlike degree centrality, which measures influence 
by counting the number of links a node has, PageRank goes 
beyond the first-degree connections and attributes higher 
weight to nodes that rank higher themselves.
Based on PageRank, we selected the 10 most influential 
propagators of each community for further qualitative analysis 
(Mayring, 2015). This included an iterative process of inter-
preting, paraphrasing, and aggregating the material under 
investigation. To characterize and understand differences and 
similarities between the communities, we built detailed pro-
files of their main propagators by analyzing each one’s profile 
description, timeline, pinned posts, used images, or videos as 
well as references to external sources. We applied an inte-
grated approach. First, we coded the type of actor (e.g., citizen, 
scientist or medical practitioner, journalist, conspiracy theory 
aggregator) for each user, which we deductively determined 
based on previous studies (e.g., Starbird, 2017). In a second 
step, information indicating users’ political leaning (e.g., con-
servative, QAnon supporter) was inductively derived from the 
data. For example, based on the profile description “God 
Fearing Family Man, Patriot, #MAGA #TRUMP2020,” we 
coded this user as a citizen (“God Fearing Family Man”) and 
Trump supporter (“#MAGA #TRUMP2020”). Furthermore, 
because recent research has shown that mainstream social 
media platforms like Twitter began to systematically crack 
down on conspiracy theory-related content and ban influential 
conspiratorial personalities (Rogers, 2020), we were interested 
in how many accounts have been suspended. Therefore, we 
coded the status of profile1 for each account (e.g., suspended, 
deleted, still active). To enrich our qualitative description with 
quantitative information, we selected user metrics (e.g., fol-
lowers, retweets, posts) for each account.
Results
Prevalent Conspiracy Theories on Twitter (RQ1)
Our network analysis of co-occurring hashtags revealed 10 
prominent conspiracy theories circulating on Twitter.2
 (1) Agenda 21 refers to the United Nations’ (UN) non-
binding action plan, signed in 1992, that encour-
ages governments to pursue sustainable 
development. Related conspiracy theories claim 
that Agenda 21 is a disguised plot to strip nations of 
their sovereignty and eventually impose global 
communism.
 (2) The Anti-Vaccination movement is opposed to the 
vaccination of children to protect them from conta-
gious diseases. In particular, supporters of this 
movement reject mandatory vaccination, despite 
the overwhelming scientific consensus on the effi-
cacy of vaccines. Moreover, they promote unproven 
links between vaccinations and a range of child-
hood illnesses and disorders, for instance, autism. 
Instead, they advocate “natural remedies” to treat 
childhood diseases.
 (3) Supporters of the Chemtrail conspiracy theory 
argue that condensation trails left behind by high-
flying aircraft contain various chemical or biologi-
cal agents, deliberately released over the public for 
nefarious purposes such as weather modification, 
psychological manipulation, or human population 
control.
 (4) Climate Change Denial, or global warming con-
spiracy theory, asserts that the scientific consensus 
of human-induced climate change is a plot based 
on manipulated data, concocted for political and 
ideological purposes. Those who subscribe to this 
theory believe that governmental agencies such as 
NASA deliberately engage in distorting informa-
tion in order to mislead the population.
 (5) The Directed Energy Weapons conspiracy theory 
emerged during the 2018 California wildfire sea-
son and postulates that the deadly wildfires 
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were deliberately lit using “directed energy weap-
ons”—experimental weapons that utilize a highly 
focused energy beam—for political purposes, 
including promoting the aforementioned climate 
change hoax.
 (6) The Flat Earth movement is an expanding pseudo-
scientific group propagating the age-old claim that 
the Earth is, in fact, a flat disk bordered by a wall of 
ice. People who subscribe to this theory argue that 
governments and government agencies such as 
NASA have attempted to cover up this “truth” by 
staging fake space missions and generating fake 
imagery of the Earth as a sphere.
 (7) Illuminati refers to the conspiracy that a selected 
group of individuals, “the Illuminati,” secretly con-
trols and masterminds global affairs in order to 
gain political power and to establish a New World 
Order.
 (8) Pizzagate relates to a debunked conspiracy that cir-
culated during the 2016 United States Presidential 
Election, claiming that coded email messages from 
Hillary Clinton’s campaign manager, John Podesta, 
implicated a series of Democratic Party officials in 
an alleged human trafficking and child sex ring. A 
pizzeria in Washington, D.C., was allegedly 
involved.
 (9) The Reptilians conspiracy theory, popularized by 
conspiracy theorist David Icke, claims that a race 
of shapeshifting reptilian aliens is attempting to 
manipulate societies by taking on human form. 
Several world leaders and popular celebrities are 
accused of being so-called Reptilians, including 
Queen Elizabeth II and Justin Bieber.
(10) The 9/11 conspiracy theory postulates that, rather 
than the work of Jihadist terrorists, the attacks on 
America on September 11, 2001, were, in fact, an 
“inside job,” orchestrated by the US government to 
justify their foreign policy agenda. It propagates 
pseudoscientific theories to prove, among other 
things, that the collapse of the Twin Towers was the 
result of a controlled demolition.
Communities Around Conspiracy Theories (RQ2)
The retweet network of these 10 conspiracy theories consists 
of 31,368 nodes and 49,510 edges, and reveals eight major 
Figure 1. Communities around conspiracy theories.
Note. Nodes and edges in the retweet network are colored according to modularity classes.
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communities with a modularity score of 0.715. In Figure 1, 
nodes represent Twitter accounts and edges represent 
retweets; the size of a node is coordinated with its in-degree, 
that is, the retweets one user receives. Community clusters 
were calculated and colored via Blondel et al.’s (2008) mod-
ularity algorithm, using a default modularity resolution of 
1.0. Because we assigned values for each node to indicate 
each given conspiracy theory, we were able to label each 
community based on its most prevalent conspiracy theories.
As Figure 1 indicates, the retweet network consists of two 
loosely connected clusters of user communities. A closer read-
ing of tweets shared within these communities reveals that the 
cluster on the left comprises two communities that do not spread 
conspiracy theories but actively oppose Flat Earth and Anti-
Vaccination conspiracy theories. The other, bigger cluster con-
tains proponents of the 10 conspiracy theories, which make up 
an additional six communities. Anti-Vaxxers and Flat Earthers 
are the biggest conspiracy theory communities, with 4,797 and 
3,562 accounts, respectively (see Table 2 for an overview). Both 
anti-conspiracy theory communities contain significantly fewer 
accounts (Pro-Vaccination: 1,923, Anti-Flat Earth: 1,650). 
Conspiracy theories concerning Chemtrails, Illuminati, and 
Reptilians are often retweeted by the same community of 
Twitter users (N = 2,945). Likewise, the conspiracy theories 
Climate Change Denial, Pizzagate, and 9/11 are often shared by 
the same user community (N = 2,574). The Directed Energy 
Weapons community has 2,535 members; the Agenda 21 com-
munity includes 2,299 accounts.
Main Propagators Within Conspiracy Theory 
Communities (RQ3)
Our in-depth analysis of the top 10 propagators,3 that is, influ-
ential accounts with the greatest ability to spread information 
within each community, revealed that individuals like citizens, 
scientists, or medical practitioners, but also aggregator 
accounts, are most prevalent (see Table 2; for a mapping of the 
most influential propagators within each community, see 
Supplementary Material, Figure A3). However, the composi-
tion of propagators differs between communities, especially 
between the anti- and pro-conspiracy theory communities.
The top propagators within the Pro-Vaccination commu-
nity include mostly science-related accounts. Among vocal 
scientists and medical practitioners are Peter Hotez (@
PeterHotez), Professor of Pediatrics and Molecular Virology 
& Microbiology, who has by far the highest influence in this 
community (13,612 followers, 876 retweets). Other exam-
ples for influential science-related propagators are Scott 
Gottlieb (@SGottliebFDA), physician and commissioner of 
the Food and Drug Administration; Daniel Kraft (@daniel_
kraft), a physician-scientist with expertise in biomedical 
research and health care innovation; as well as Meghan May 
(@DrMay5), Professor of Microbiology and Infectious 
Diseases. Besides researchers and physicians, the scientific 
journal Microbes and Infection (@MicrobesInfect), a citizen, 
and an aggregating account called “TheReal Truther” (@the-
real_truther), which exposes “lies, propaganda & hate of the 
Table 2. Overview of Conspiracy Theory Communities and Propagators.
Communities Propagators
Accounts Top 10 propagators Followers Retweets Posts PageRank 
(×1,000)
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Pro-Vaccination 1,923 Scientists (N = 7) 14,228 18,725 245 315 65 115 2.35 2.78
Citizens (N = 1) 1,127 62 49 0.80  
Scientific journals (N = 1) 62,116 83 9 0.69  
Aggregators (N = 1) 1,372 34 109 0.41  
Anti-Flat Earth 1,650 Scientists (N = 4) 154,806 305,148 415 825 1 0 3.55 7.05
Citizens (N = 4) 514 785 3 2 6 7 0.03 0.02
Blogs (N = 1) 536 6 1 0.06  
Journalists (N = 1) 4,965 6 2 0.06  
Anti-Vaccination 4,797 Citizens (N = 9) 18,198 45,265 677 1,848 74 71 5.39 14.71
Organizations (N = 1) 2,345 148 57 1.92  
Flat Earth 3,562 Citizens (N = 7) 3,394 2,733 201 67 53 37 1.50 0.43
Aggregators (N = 3) 7,845 2,755 440 89 75 68 2.80 0.99
Chemtrails, Illuminati, 
Reptilians
2,945 Citizens (N = 8) 1,479 1,443 260 191 54 58 2.06 0.97
Aggregators (N = 2) 16,066 613 408 148 155 19 2.75 0.86
Climate Change Denial, 
Pizzagate, 9/11
2,574 Citizens (N = 10) 27,102 24,893 251 292 7 5 2.73 2.35
Directed Energy 
Weapons
2,535 Citizens (N = 10) 46,475 77,800 352 812 19 18 2.41 5.88
Agenda 21 2,299 Citizens (N = 10) 14,335 15,414 179 138 11 13 1.56 1.30
Note. M = mean, SD = standard deviation.
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anti-science movement,” actively spread information in 
favor of vaccination.
Similarly, top accounts among the Anti-Flat Earth com-
munity are often scientists, such as astronomer and science 
blogger Philip Plait, “The Bad Astronomer” (@
BadAstronomer), who is the most influential actor in this 
community (612,527 followers, 1,653 retweets, 1,519 posts); 
George Claassen (@GeorgeClaassen), South African scien-
tist and science journalist; or Jeff Ollerton (@JeffOllerton), 
Professor of Biodiversity. In addition, the community 
includes citizens, Rob Davis (@robwdavis), an investigative 
journalist at The Oregonian, and the author of the scientific 
blog “The Conquest of Space” (@conquestofspace), which 
aims to appeal to space enthusiasts.
In contrast to accounts advocating vaccination, the 10 
most influential Anti-Vaccination propagators largely con-
sist of self-described “enlightened” citizens “searching for 
truth” about the harm of vaccination. Like anti-conspiracy 
theory accounts, most of the main propagators within the 
Anti-Vaccination community do not convey their political 
leanings in their profile. A notable exception is one user who 
explicitly self-identifies as a “TRUMP SUPPORTER!!” in 
his profile, frequently using the hashtag “#MAGA,” refer-
ring to Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential slogan “Make 
America Great Again.” In addition, this user points out his 
support of QAnon, a meta-conspiracy theory claiming that 
Trump is battling a cabal of shadow groups including United 
States Democrats, business tycoons, and Hollywood celeb-
rities who are secretly ruling the world (Zuckerman, 2019). 
Among the most influential propagators of Anti-Vaccination 
content is the editor of “Natural News,” Mike Adams (@
healthranger), a conspiracy theory website known for pro-
moting pseudoscientific claims and far-right extremism 
(138,560 followers, 5,605 retweets); as well as the organiza-
tion “A Voice for Choice” (@avoiceforchoice) with 2,345 
followers. According to their self-description, they speak 
out “against the practices of the food, agriculture, and phar-
maceutical industries that infringe on people’s rights to con-
trol what they put into their bodies” (A Voice for Choice 
Advocacy, 2020).
The most prominent accounts of the Flat Earth community 
are individual citizens. They admonish, for example, that one 
should not believe everything the “controllers” say, and encour-
age others to break free. In addition, conspiracy theory aggrega-
tors curating Flat Earth–related conspiracy theories are influential 
propagators within this community. One example for such an 
aggregator is “WeAreWakinUp” (@WeAreWakinUp) with 
11,018 followers, 519 retweets, and 154 posts.
Conspiracy theories concerning Chemtrails, Illuminati, and 
Reptilians are also often disseminated by citizens and 
Figure 2. Deplatformed accounts within conspiracy theory communities.
Note. Nodes and edges in the retweet network are colored according to users’ profile status: Deplatformed accounts (pink), deleted accounts (yellow), 
and accounts that are still active (blue).
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conspiracy theory aggregators. Important in this community is 
the aggregator “The Truth Community” (@chooselovetoday) 
with 16,500 followers, 513 retweets, and 169 posts. This 
account describes itself as a “member-based supported com-
munity UNITED in our belief #truth saves” and supports con-
spiracy theories like Chemtrails, Illuminati, Reptilians, and 
many others. Citizens in this community portray themselves 
either as “seekers of the truth” or supporters of Donald Trump 
and the Second Amendment of the US Constitution which pro-
tects the right to bear arms.
Main propagators among the three communities 
Directed Energy Weapons, Agenda 21, and Climate 
Change Denial, Pizzagate, 9/11 can be described as citi-
zens with similar political leanings: Trump supporters, 
QAnon followers, conservatives, patriots, and supporters 
of the Second Amendment. Typically, these accounts 
describe themselves as, for instance, “politically incorrect 
freethinker,” “Christian,” or “Patriot!” Within these three 
communities, some individuals are highly influential and 
visible with up to 102,328 followers.
In line with previous research on deplatforming on 
social media (e.g., Rogers, 2020), our results also show 
that Twitter has been suspending influential propagators 
within conspiracy theory communities and especially 
within communities dominated by Trump and QAnon sup-
porters. Moreover, the profile descriptions of some users 
who are still active refer to their account on Gab—a micro-
blogging service launched in 2016 that has attracted a large 
number of radical conservatives and conspiracy theo-
rists—or Parler—a social networking service launched in 
2018 that has brought together Trump supporters, right-
wing extremists, and conspiracy theorists.
Shifting the focus from the micro level to the macro level, 
Figure 2 displays that the number of deplatformed accounts 
is higher in pro-conspiracy theory communities (895 
accounts, 4.78%) than in anti-conspiracy theory communi-
ties (27 accounts, 0.76%). A chi-square test with Yates’ con-
tinuity correction points toward significant differences 
between communities: χ2(1) = 121.68, p < .001.
Discussion
Conspiracy theories are a fast-changing phenomenon and 
highly responsive to external events. In light of the ongoing 
COVID-19 pandemic, a plethora of conspiracy theories 
abound online. Going beyond previous studies on either the 
general phenomenon of conspiracy theories (e.g., Del Vicario 
et al., 2016) or specific conspiracy theories (e.g., Broniatowski 
et al., 2018), our study provides an empirically informed 
comparison of the most visible conspiracy theories on Twitter 
by shedding light on the interplay of platform affordances and 
the dissemination of conspiracy theory content.
Regarding the diversity of conspiracy theories, our results 
reveal a variety of prevalent conspiratorial explanations cir-
culating on Twitter: Agenda 21, Anti-Vaccination, 
Chemtrails, Climate Change Denial, Directed Energy 
Weapons, Flat Earth, Illuminati, Pizzagate, Reptilians, and 
9/11. While most of these conspiracy theories are directed 
against the establishment and elite, referring to secret machi-
nations of influential people or institutions acting for their 
own benefit (e.g., Agenda 21, Illuminati), others construct 
narratives challenging science, epistemic institutions, or sci-
entists (e.g., Anti-Vaccination, Flat Earth).
Concerning communities evolving around conspiracy 
theories on Twitter as well as main propagators within these 
communities, our results reveal two loosely connected clus-
ters of pro- and anti-conspiracy theories. Both anti-conspir-
acy theory communities, Anti-Flat Earth and Pro-Vaccination, 
are centered around scientists and medical practitioners. 
Their use of pro-conspiracy theory hashtags likely is an 
attempt to directly engage and confront users who dissemi-
nate conspiracy theories. Studies from social psychology 
have shown that cross-group communication can be an effec-
tive way to resolve misunderstandings, rumors, and misin-
formation (e.g., DiFonzo, 2013). By deliberately using 
pro-conspiracy hashtags, anti-conspiracy theory accounts 
inject their ideas into the conspiracists’ conversations. 
However, our study suggests that this visibility does not 
translate into cross-group communication, that is, retweeting 
each other’s messages. This, in turn, indicates that debunking 
efforts hardly traverse the two clusters.
Finally, our study lends support to previous assertions that 
social media platforms are taking increasingly proactive 
measures to systematically crack down on accounts promot-
ing conspiracy theories (e.g., Rogers, 2020). As our results 
show, users banned from Twitter are predominantly those 
who propagate conspiracy theories.
Alignments Between Conspiracy Theories and 
Their Communities
In line with recent research demonstrating that conspiracy 
beliefs tend to “stick together” (Douglas et al., 2019, p. 7; van 
Prooijen, 2018), our study reveals a general proximity between 
several conspiracy theories. We argue that three factors help us 
to explore these overlaps in more depth. First, the closely 
aligned conspiracy theories Climate Change Denial, Pizzagate, 
and 9/11 share structural and thematic features. They provide 
alternative rationales and explanations for national or interna-
tional policies, political affairs, or events, challenging accounts 
from governments and official authorities (Huneman & Vorms, 
2018; Räikkä, 2009). Other conspiracy theories such as 
Chemtrail, Reptilians, and Illuminati emphasize a conspiracy of 
powerful groups and non-human entities, claiming that, for 
instance, aliens or secret societies rule the world (Uscinski, 
2018). In contrast to political conspiracy theories, these con-
spiracies mingle reality with fiction and are often closely tied to 
popular culture such as Dan Brown’s novel “The Da Vinci 
Code.” Second, factors such as ideological and geographic 
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proximity further help explain alignments between conspiracy 
theories. A shared characteristic of several conspiracy theories is 
that they are disseminated by people with conservative political 
views who support Donald Trump and that they are mostly pop-
ular in the United States. For instance, conspiracy theories 
around Climate Change, Agenda 21, and Directed Energy 
Weapons have their roots in anti-environmentalist and anti-glo-
balist ideologies, both of which are aligned with conservative 
political ideology and values (Kirilenko & Stepchenkova, 2014) 
and popular among the political right and populists in the United 
States (Harris et al., 2017). 9/11 and Pizzagate conspiracy theo-
ries are also widely promoted by conservative and right-wing 
politicians in the United States and often supported by individu-
als who hold conservative beliefs (Stempel et al., 2007). In con-
trast, believers in Anti-Vaccination, Flat Earth, Reptilians, 
Illuminati, and Chemtrail conspiracy theories can be found 
across the political spectrum, and their respective communities 
are less US-centric. For instance, Anti-Vaccination sentiment is 
on the rise around the globe and the movement finds supporters 
on both the political left and right (Holt, 2018). In addition, 
some of the most influential propagators of Illuminati and 
Reptilians conspiracy theories are based outside the United 
States (Robertson, 2013), which underlines the importance of 
societal and political contexts to understand the propagation 
patterns of conspiracy theories.
Limitations and Future Research
As all studies, ours comes with some limitations as well. A 
general limitation resides in the way we built our sample. 
First, hashtag-based approaches to collect tweets leave out 
ancillary discussions by participants who have chosen not to 
use these hashtags or any hashtags at all (Burgess & Bruns, 
2015). Future studies should dive deeper and make use of 
alternative sampling methods, such as including specific user-
defined keywords, utilizing topic-related dictionaries or clas-
sifiers, or examine recent tweeting history and follower 
network information of participating accounts to capture fur-
ther communication (Burgess & Bruns, 2015). Second, our 
analysis was limited to a relatively small sample of English-
language Twitter only, limiting the generalizability of our find-
ings. As prior research suggests that conspiracy theories are 
communicated differently according to national and regional 
contexts (e.g., Gray, 2008), studies on other languages and lin-
guistic regions would be recommendable.
To further enhance our understanding of conspiracy theo-
ries in digital environments, future research should incorpo-
rate more cross-platform, cross-lingual, and cross-regional 
comparative perspectives in general. Furthermore, we argue 
that future research of online conspiracy theories should not 
be limited to mainstream platforms, such as Twitter, 
Facebook, or YouTube. These platforms, as indicated in both 
literature (e.g., Rogers, 2020) and our current study, have 
been systematically cracking down on accounts that promote 
conspiracy theories. As more and more conspiracy theorists 
and their followers migrate to “alternative” social media, 
such as Gab, BitChute, and Parler, more research will be 
required to investigate the impacts of this trend.
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Notes
1. Using Twitter’s API, we verified the status of all accounts in 
Dataset D2 in early July 2019.
2. We have rich verbatim material we used in our analysis. To 
protect users’ privacy, however, we decided not to quote from 
tweets verbatim.
3. Screen names are only mentioned if public figures are involved.
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